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. but the second point i think our first of all the pentagon didn't show you any video. that's bad puerto rico. and the percentage of the weapons that were smart weapons and the first gulf war more than anything the iraqis had was remarkably small compared to the impression the pentagon gave in their military briefings where the only showed pictures of smart bombs and missiles and things flying through windows. there was a very tiny percentage of the actions actually expended. so i don't think that this was so much a revolution of military affairs as a vivid demonstration as you pointed out on just how proficient the united states was in waging a war especially against a less proficient adversary but it was a more philosophical way and that is and the ultimate goal of the conflict was a political goal so there for the military planning involves both smart and some weapons and they were designed with a traditional military conclusion which in truth wasn't revolutionary at all which was getting the enemy to do what we wanted. so i can't see the revolutionary military affairs. i am getting a sign
but the second two points the pentagon did not show you any video the percentage of footprints that were smart well infinitely more than what the iraqis had was small compared to the impression the pentagon gave we're the only showed pictures, that was a tiny percentage. so i don't think this was a revolution as you pointed out just how proficient united states was in waging war with a less proficient adversary. in the more philosophical and fundamental way that the ultimate goal of the conflict was a political goal so the military planning with the air war were designed with a traditional military conclusion which in truth was not revolutionary at all so i cannot see it in revolutionary affairs i do see we're running at a time by one to give him a chance to comment. >> as i alluded to the revolutionary of military affairs the something that came at the time goldwater nichols was passed to join the military and was all that was talked about back in the '80s and what it meant to me is finally, coming at a vietnam , we had thinkers in the military said said it worked through what it takes to wag
, first of all, the pentagon didn't show you any video of things that missed. that's bad pr. and the percentage of weapons that were smart weapons in the first gulf war while infinitely more than anything the iraqis had was remarkably small compared to the impression the pentagon gave in their military briefings where they'd only show pictures of smart bombs and smart missiles and things flying through windows. that was a very, very tiny percentage of the munitions actually expended. so i don't think this was so much a revolution in military affairs so much as a vivid demonstration, as you point out, of just how proficient the united states was in waging war especially against a less proficient adversary. but it also was military affairs in a more philosophical, fundamental way, and that is claus wits still has a vote here, and the ultimate goal of the conflict was a political goal and, therefore, the military planning and the air war being a classic case in point of this were designed with a traditional military conclusion which in truth was not revolutionary at all which w
a vast network of old colleagues throughout the pentagon bureaucracy. is reaching out to them. he deliberately forms a back channel. he cultivates this woman in the white house named meghan o'sullivan who was president bush's chief adviser on iraq in the national security council. he sees she's waving from the policy, he cultivates her. they're talking on the phone practically every day. now, picture this. this is kind of average. his petraeus, a three-star general in fort leavenworth. is talking on the phone everyday with the senior advisor to the president of united states. she will be asking him, general casey who is a four-star general actually commanding troop in iraq if general casey as we only need one more brigade, what do you think with an petraeus would muster these arguments that she could funnel to her seniors on why this really isn't enough. so, you know, when he comes to washington and meets in restaurants -- by the way, this is not, this is strictly professional. can you imagine, this is someone, essentially subverting the chain of command, getting his own views acr
wasn't just sitting in leavenworth, she had a network of old colleagues for the pentagon bureaucracy he's reaching out to them he cultivates this woman in the white house named megan sullivan whose president bush's chief adviser on iraq and the national security council. he sees that she is kind of labor and on the existing policy and cultivates. he's a three-star general from fort leave
official in the pentagon told me it sounds like having a fought crime from 1984. that would be a problem. theythought crime from 1984. that would be a problem. they did decide to import conspiracy and civilian law to military law. it is easy to prove as opposed to things they are conspiring to do more have done. for the same reason it has been disfavored as a war crime. the nuremberg tribunal rejected conspiracy conviction for the most part. the rationale is just that the nature of armed conflict is doing things in a group. since that is what the entire endeavour is, to unmask coordinated violence, making one participant guilty of the act of all the other participants would be too broad. that is the rationale. but what happened with the twenty-first century military commission project was several civilian crime such as conspiracy were imported into this military code but it raise problems from the get go because these military officers knew that that was not really a war crime. they had been taught was not, like mutilating bodies or the other things that traditionally have been war crime
the enemy didn't have. but the second two points i think at that first of all the pentagon didn't show you any video of things it missed. that's bad pr. and the percentage of weapons that were smart weapons in the first gulf war while infinitely anything more than the iraqis had was remarkably small. compared to the impression the pentagon gave in the military briefings where they only showed pictures of smart bombs and smart missiles seen flying through windows. that was a very, very tiny percentage of the munitions actually expend. so i don't think this is so much a revolution of military affairs so much as a vivid demonstration as you pointed out as just a proficient at united states was in waging war, especially against a less proficient adversary. but it also was a military affairs, and that is the ultimate goal of the conflict was a political goal. and so, therefore, the military planning that involve both smart and dumb weapons in a war where design with a traditional military conclusion, which in truth was not revolution at all which was getting the enemy to do what you wanted. so
Search Results 0 to 6 of about 7

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